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Abstract
One of the most important and controversial legal issues arising in connection with binational
dispute settlement panels under the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and its
predecessor, the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (“CFTA”), has been the standard
of judicial review that panels must apply to U.S. antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duty
(“CVD”) cases. This standard generated particular controversy in three cases involving substantial
amounts of trade from Canada into the United States – lumber, swine, and frozen pork. The
United States contended that panels reviewing U.S. agencies’ decisions in those cases incorrectly
applied the standard of review by failing to grant the requisite deference to the agency. When
the United States challenged the panels’ decisions before Extraordinary Challenge Committees
(“ECCs”), the ECCs let them stand. As a result, when negotiating the NAFTA, the United States
succeeded in strengthening the attention paid to the standard of review that ECCs must grant when
reviewing panel decisions. The United States’ experience with binational panels has thus enhanced
awareness of the concept of standard of review. While an explanation of the standard could fill
volumes and cover hundreds of cases, the Authors of this Essay will attempt to present a practical,
common sense analysis that may aid practitioners, panelists, law students, business people, and
scholars to appreciate better the application of this principle.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most important and controversial legal issues
arising in connection with binational dispute settlement panels
under the North American Free Trade Agreement' ("NAFTA")
and its predecessor, the United States-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment2 ("CFTA"), has been the standard of judicial review that
panels must apply to U.S. antidumping ("AD") and counter-
vailing duty ("CVD") cases. This standard generated particular
controversy in three cases involving substantial amounts of trade
from Canada into the United States - lumber, swine, and fro-
zen poik. The United States contended that panels reviewing
U.S. agencies' decisions in those cases incorrectly applied the
standard of review by failing to grant the requisite deference to
the agency. When the United States challenged the panels' deci-
sions before Extraordinary Challenge Committees ("ECCs"), the
ECCs let them stand.' As a result, when negotiating the NAFTA,
* The views expressed in this Essay are the personal opinions of the Authors and
do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Commerce or of any other
agency of the U.S. Government. This Essay is adapted from a speech prepared for a
symposium held in November 1995, at the Legal Center for Inter-American Trade and
Commerce, Monterrey Institute of Technology and Advanced Studies. The original
speech will be included in a collection of symposium materials to be published by the
Center.
** Chief Counsel, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Chief, Countervailing Duty Litigation, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
1. Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993) (entered into forceJan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement,Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
3. See ECC 91-1904-01 (Pork Injury); ECC 93-1904-01 (Live Swine CVD); ECC 94-
1904-01 (Lumber CVD). Under the United States-Canada Free trade Agreement
("CFTA") and the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), the Extraordi-
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the United States succeeded in strengthening the attention paid
to the standard of review that ECCs must grant when reviewing
panel decisions.4
The United States' experience with binational panels has
thus enhanced awareness of the concept of standard of review.
While an explanation of the standard could fill volumes and
cover hundreds of cases, the Authors of this Essay will attempt to
present a practical, common sense analysis that may aid practi-
tioners, panelists, law students, business people, and scholars to
appreciate better the application of this principle.
I. BACKGROUND
Under Article 1904 of the NAFTA, final AD/CVD determi-
nations covering goods of another NAFTA Party - Canada or
Mexico - are subject to review by binational panels selected by
the two governments involved, in lieu of review in the national
courts of the importing country.5 Decisions of the panels, com-
posed of independent experts appointed on a one-time basis to
decide a particular complaint, are binding international obliga-
tions of the Parties. This makes the binational panel system a
unique transfer ofjudicial power to a private, non-judicial, ad hoc
entity. Panelists cannot be government employees or otherwise
affiliated with involved governments 6 and a majority of the pan-
elists on a given panel, including the chair, must be lawyers in
good standing. Panelists are also required to have a general fa-
miliarity with international trade law.7
This emphasis on legal knowledge, even for the non-lawyer
panelists, is well-placed, because the NAFTA requires that panels
nary Challenge Committees' ("ECC") appellate review is limited. NAFTA, supra note 1,
art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
4. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13) (a) (iii), 32 I.L.M. at 683. It is interesting to
note that, while the Canadian and Mexican standards of review are at least as complex
as the United States', they have not yet occasioned such controversy. There have been
no ECCs concerning decisions of Canadian or Mexican trade agencies.
5. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(g) (2)-(4) (1994). Private parties have the right to forego
binational panel review in favor of continuing to pursue legal redress in the domestic
courts. Id. Virtually all determinations involving goods of a NAFTA party, however,
have been reviewed by binational panels established under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA,
or its predecessor. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT: FACrORS CONTRIBUTING TO CONTROVERSY IN APPEALS OF TRADE REM-
EDY CASES TO BINATIONAL PANELS, GAO/GGD-95-175BR (June 1995).
6. Judges are not considered affiliated with governments for this purpose.
7. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2, 1-2, 32 I.L.M. at 687.
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determine whether the investigating authority has properly ap-
plied its own AD/CVD law. The body bases its determination on
the record created during the administrative process, and uses
the standard of review and general legal principles that would
apply in that country's courts. In other words, the panel is to
substitute for the courts of the importing country in reviewing
AD/CVD determinations and to apply the same rules that a
court would apply.8
II. WHAT ARE UNFAIR TRADELAWS?
The unfair trade laws - in particular, the AD/CVD laws -
are the subject of Chapter 19 NAFTA review.' Dumping is often
called price discrimination between national markets: the sale
of merchandise to an export market for a price that is less than
the exporter charges for such merchandise in its home or third-
country markets or less than it costs to produce the merchan-
dise.' ° Dumping is condemned by most of the international
community because it sends false signals to the market. In the
short term dumping may reduce prices to consumers in the im-
porting country. In the long run, however, it causes resources to
be misallocated by acting as a disincentive to investment in the
country where the dumping is occurring and as an incentive to
investment in the market of the dumping company. Dumping
may lead to the collapse of the industry where the dumping is
occurring and the domination of the market by foreign compa-
nies, which may then engage in monopolistic or oligopolistic
pricing behavior."
8. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(3), 32 I.L.M. at 683. Specifically, Article 1904(3)
of Chapter 19 of the NAFTA requires a binational panel reviewing an antidumping
("AD") or countervailing duty ("CVD") determination of the competent investigating
authority to apply "the standard of review set out in Annex 1911 and the general legal
principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would apply to a review of a
determination of the competent investigating authority." Id.
9. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 19, 32 I.L.M. at 680.
10. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 653-63 (2d ed. 1986) (excerpting from various authors' views of eco-
nomics of dumping).
11. Not all economists agree with this analysis. See, e.g., JACKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 10, at 658-61 (excerptingJohn J. Barcelo, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise
It, 1 MICH. YB. INT'L. LEGAL STUDIES 53, 61-64 (1979) (maintaining true predatory pric-
ing is rare because it is costly and benefits are doubtful)). A strictly free market analysis
of dumping, however, overlooks the political pressures created by dislocations of com-
panies and workers. See id. at 657 (excerpting Bart S. Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the
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Government subsidies are also considered unfair if they are
conditioned on export or provided to specific industries, rather
than being spread broadly across the economy. These targeted
government benefits, although they are often important to the
accomplishment of a country's social and economic goals, dis-
tort a country's comparative advantage. The subsidies put ex-
porters in the position of competing against foreign govern-
ments instead of other producers. Once again, the Govern-
ment's action sends the same false market signals as in the case
of dumping.
If this price discrimination or government subsidization in-
jures a domestic industry, the importing country is permitted to
take action under its national laws by the Antidumping and Sub-
sidies Agreements, which are part of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").2 GATT is the umbrella agreement
which contains guidelines for international trading. Since the
entry into force of the results of the Uruguay Round of multilat-
eral negotiations,1 - GATT operates under the umbrella of the
World Trade Organization.
In the United States, the Commerce Department ("Com-
merce") determines whether dumping or subsidization exists,
and the U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC") deter-
mines whether injury results. 4 If both findings are affirmative,
Commerce issues an order requiring that the Customs Service
collect offsetting duties at the border, in the amount of the
dumping or subsidy, on imports of this merchandise. This order
United States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAw & POLICY INT'L. Bus. 85-93); id. at 726
(excerpting Gary C. Hufbauer &Joanna Shelton Erb, The Rationalefor Disciplining Subsi-
dies, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1984) (stating concentrated interests of
producers command greater political support than diffuse interests of consumers)).
Also overlooked is the fact that the dumping and subsidy laws require proof of injury
before producers may benefit from protection. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673 (1994).
Thus, consumers may freely benefit from the low prices of dumped or subsidized (i.e.,
unfairly traded) goods, provided no injury is occurring to the producers in the consum-
ing country.
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
STAT. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
13. See Final Act. Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, art. 2, 33 I.L.M. 1. By signing the Final Act, the
state representatives agreed to submit the Uruguay Round Agreements for considera-
tion by their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Uruguay Round Agreements in accordance with their national procedures. Id.
14. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 et seq. (1994).
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aims to remove the false market signal and the resulting eco-
nomic inefficiencies caused by the dumping or subsidization. It
attempts to restore market forces as the determinants of pricing
decisions, and of investment decisions based on those prices.
III. THE U.S. STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AD/CVD
DETERMINATIONS
It is often said that the standard of review for a U.S. AD/
CVD determination is whether the decision is reasonable. This
is a useful shorthand description of the standard, which the
courts themselves have often cited.1 5 The statute, however, sets
forth a more precise standard, which in turn has been analyzed
exhaustively in decades ofjudicial decision-making. 16 This statu-
tory standard is whether the agency's determination is supported
by substantial evidence on the record or is otherwise in accord-
ance with law.' 7 The phrase "substantial evidence on the rec-
ord," applies to findings of fact, and the phrase, "in accordance
with law," applies to issues of law.
Before elaborating upon the U.S. standard of review, some
preliminary matters should be clarified. The appellate, or re-
viewing, bodies applying the standard are the U.S. Court of In-
ternational Trade ("CIT"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"),18 and Chapter 19 NAFTA
15. See, e.g., SSIH Equipment SA. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 718
F.2d 365, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (additional comments ofJ. Nies); National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., - U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 1394, 1401-02 (1992).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B) (1994). More precisely, the statute requires the
reviewing body to "hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found...
to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law." Id. This standard has been widely used in U.S. administrative law for
review of many agencies' decisions. See SSIH, 718 F. 2d at 381-82. A different standard
does apply to certain AD/CVD determinations. See NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1911,
32 I.L.M. at 691-93; 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (A) (1994).
17. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B) (1994).
18. The Federal Circuit, although it reviews the decision of the Court of Interna-
tional Trade ("CIT"), applies anew the standard of review to Commerce's or the Inter-
national Trade Commission's ("ITC") decision. Atlantic Sugar v: United States, 744 F.
2d 1556, 1559 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cited in NEC Home Electronics, Ltd. v. United
States, 54 F.3d 736, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas v.
United States, 44 F.3d 978, 982 n.1 (Fed. Cir 1994); see also PPG Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 978 F.2d 1232, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The two-tier system of appellate
review, by which three Federal Circuitjudges review the decision of one CITjudge, with
both courts applying the same standard of review to the trade agency's decision, is unu-
sual if not unique in administrative law. NAFTA's system is not parallel: five panelists
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panels.' 9 The U.S. agencies subject to the standard are Com-
merce and the ITC. The agencies do not apply the standard.
This raises a matter which is a common source of confusion: the
distinction between standard of review and standard of proof.
The standard of review is the standard that the reviewing or
appellate court or panel ("reviewing body" or "body") - not the
deciding agency - applies to the case. It is usually specified by
statute and most commonly is one of four standards: de novo,
clearly erroneous, supported by substantial evidence, or arbitrary
and capricious. A Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit has ex-
plained that these standards, with regard to findings of fact, are
equivalent to questions of increasingly narrow focus: is it right,
is it wrong, is it unreasonable, or is it irrational?2 °
Not to be confused with the appellate court's standard of
review, however, is the trial court's or agency's standard of proof.
These are judge-made and usually are one of three standards:
preponderance or weight of the evidence, clear and convincing
proof, or beyond a reasonable doubt.' Since these are the stan-
dards which a fact-finder or trial court applies, we need discuss
them no more.
A further point to clarify about our standard of review as it
applies to AD/CVD cases is that it is confined to the record. The
reviewing body has no authority to receive evidence on its own; it
is strictly limited to reviewing "information presented to or ob-
tained by [the agency] . . . during the course of the administra-
tive proceeding."22 An inquiry beyond the record constitutes an
impermissible substitution of the court's or panel'sjudgment for
that of the agency. 3 One may liken this to a person sitting down
to a meal prepared in a restaurant: you cannot go in the kitchen
review the trade agency's decision and usually have the final say. Only in "extraordi-
nary" cases will a panel's decision be appealed to an ECC, which in turn does not pos-
sess the full power of review of the Federal Circuit. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13),
32 I.L.M. at 683. Cf supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing ECC's limited
appellate review in Pork, Live Swine, and Lumber cases).
19. NAFTA, supra, note 1, annex 1901.2, 32 I.L.M. at 687 (stating procedure for
establishing Chapter 19 Binational Panels).
20. SSIH, 718 F.2d at 381.
21. Id. at 380.
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (2) (A) (i) (1994).
23. See, e.g., Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 212, 215 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984).
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to cook the meal yourself. You are limited to expressing your
opinion on what the chef has served.
A practical aspect of this rule is that attorneys must advise
clients to get it right the first time. All the evidence needed to
advocate a case must be put before the agency and on the record
during the administrative proceeding itself. It will be too late to
try and correct factual omissions by proffering evidence to the
reviewing body. Judicial or panel review of an AD/CVD determi-
nation is a far different process than arbitration. Many arbitra-
tions provide for fact-finding, including the gathering of docu-
ments and the testimony of witnesses. Chapter 19 NAFTA
panels are neither arbitral nor trial bodies; they function as
courts of appeal and rely on the record below.
With these preliminary points aside, we will try to highlight
the most-cited of decades of cases concerning the U.S. standard
of review. If these concepts were easy, we would not have so
many hundreds ofjudicial pronouncements, including Supreme
Court pronouncements. Judges who gain experience in apply-
ing these concepts year after year presumably do gain an under-
standing of them, but even then, experienced judges often differ
in their application of the standard.
The first and probably the most-cited definition of substan-
tial evidence came from our Supreme Court nearly sixty years
ago: "[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." 4 But what exactly a "scin-
tilla" was, more or less than a little gleam in a heap of otherwise
undistinguished evidence, still remained a question. Due to this
ambiguity the Supreme Court, in 1951, went to great lengths to
clarify and amplify the standard.25 For one thing, courts were
getting lazy and deciding that, if they read one part of the record
and found some evidence that supported the agency, they did
not need to read any more and could affirm.26 The Supreme
Court let it be known that appellate courts must do their home-
work and canvas the whole record to determine whether the evi-
dence was substantial.
24. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
25. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474
(1951).
26. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 481, 490.
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The Court warned, however, that the reviewing body does
not review issues of fact de novo.2 7 This point is critical. The
reviewing body applying the substantial evidence standard, must
defer to the agency if what the agency has done has sufficient
support. This is true, even if the agency's ruling is not what the
reviewing body would have done in the first instance. As the
Supreme Court clarified yet again, substantial evidence is "some-
thing less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does
not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being sup-
ported by substantial evidence." 2
While these may be fine words from the United States
Supreme Court, how they apply to a real case is the primary con-
cern. Unfortunately, the fact patterns and evidence in these
cases and various other Commerce and ITC cases2 9 are too com-
plicated to discuss briefly. An example illustrates the point
much more clearly.
Suppose that Commerce found, as a matter of fact, that on
September 21, 1995, the sky was black. A losing party appeals
that issue to the CIT or a NAFTA panel and contends that the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence on the
record, which establishes, in fact, that the sky was blue that day.
The reviewing body would be required to canvas the entire rec-
ord, which might consist of photographs of the sky over a 24-
hour period, weather reports, testimony from witnesses who ob-
served the sky, and other evidence.3 0 The reviewing body might
be tempted to conclude that, in fact, the sky was blue that day, or
red-orange, or blue-and-white, or gray. Nevertheless, if evidence
on the record reasonably supports Commerce's finding, the
27. Id. at 488. "[A] court may [not] displace the [agency's] choice between two
fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different
choice had the matter been before it de novo." Id.
28. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
29. See, e.g., American Alloys, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
ICC Industries, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 694 (Fed. Cir. 1987), Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
30. Real administrative records in AD/CVD cases often fill boxes or consist of doz-
ens of microfiche. Thus, as a practical matter, the court or panel will often rely on
counsel to point out what portions of the record are relevant. The competitive forces
unleashed by our system of advocacy usually result in the record being thoroughly
searched and critically examined by attorneys on opposing sides. The court or panel,
however, may review the record further if it has reason to be dissatisfied with the mate-
rial brought to its attention.
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standard dictates that the reviewing body affirm the agency re-
gardless of any inclination that a different finding could or
should have been made.
The reviewing body may have before it an issue of law, such
as a question of statutory interpretation, instead of a factual is-
sue. In this instance, the reviewing body must apply a two-step
analysis. First, if the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face,
the Supreme Court has said "that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Congress. 13 For example, sup-
pose that the antidumping statute states that the agency may cal-
culate antidumping duties only when the sky is blue.32 Suppose
further that the administrative record establishes that the agency
calculated antidumping duties on an overcast day. For the re-
viewing body, there can be no ambiguity here: the agency has
failed to act in accordance with law.
Frequently, however, the statute is ambiguous or unclear.
In these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "U]udicial
deference to reasonable interpretations by an agency of a statute
that it administers is a dominant, well settled principle of federal
law."3 In other words, " 'if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.' "' As has been so often summarized, the
standard is whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is
reasonable. 5
To continue with the hypothetical, suppose that the statute
still states the agency may calculate antidumping duties only
when the sky is blue. Suppose, however, that the administrative
record reveals that the day was partly cloudy when the agency
calculated antidumping duties. The agency argues before the
reviewing body that Congress must have intended for the agency
to be able to calculate antidumping duties on partly cloudy days,
because there are relatively few days when the sky is entirely, per-
31. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
32. For the sake of authenticity, the text of the statute states,"The agency may cal-
culate antidumping duties only when the sky is blue."
33. National PER Passenger, 503 U.S. at 417-18 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 417.
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fectly blue, while there are many days when the agency must go
about its business of calculating dumping margins. Opposing
counsel says that the statute is clear on its face and means what it
says.
The reviewing body must decide if the agency's interpreta-
tion is reasonable. If the reviewing body strictly construes the
statute and believes that the statute is unambiguous, the body
will find that blue is blue, and reverse the agency. If, however,
the body finds that the statute is not so clear - that Congress
could not have intended for blue to mean perfectly, eternally,
cloudlessly blue - then the body will consider the agency's ar-
guments. The body will look at the legislative history, if any, of
the statute, and any other cases on point. The body will also
want to be sure it is clear about the facts to which the agency is
applying the statute. That is, the body should be clear whether
the day was only a little bit cloudy, or very cloudy. Based on this
information, the body will weigh the arguments on both sides of
the issue, testing the strengths and weaknesses of each. The
body may even conclude that, had it been the agency decision-
maker, it would have interpreted the statute differently. Never-
theless, if the reviewing body finds that the agency's construction
is reasonable and permissible, the body must defer to the
agency's expertise and affirm the agency's interpretation.
The tax pass-through issue 36 is a good example of a trade
case where U.S. courts applied the reasonableness standard in
reviewing an issue of law because it shows the CIT and the Fed-
eral Circuit applying the same standard with different results.
Under the U.S. antidumping statute, prior to the Uruguay
Round revisions, Commerce compared the home market price
of the product to the U.S. price to determine if there existed a
dumping margin.37 In order to compare comparable prices, we
stripped extra charges to get back to an ex-factory price in each
instance. When the home market country, in this case Korea,
charged a value added or sales tax on merchandise that was sold
36. Elizabeth C. Seastrum & Priya Aalagiri, Recent Developments in Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Cases: November 1992 - October 1994, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L.J. 503, 505-
06 (1995) (citing Daewoo Electronics v. International Union of Electronic, Electrical,
Technical Salaried and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, 6 F.3d 1511, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2672 (1994)). In the context of antidumping, "pass through" is
defined as consumer tax incidence in the exporting country. Id.
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(C) (1994).
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in the home market,. but not on merchandise sold abroad, the
United States equalized the two prices by adding the value ad-
ded tax on the U.S. price. Our statute, however, allowed us to
do so "only to the extent that such taxes are added to or in-
cluded in the price of such or similar merchandise when sold in
the country of exportation."38 Ambiguity existed in the meaning
of the words "added to or included in the price." Millions of
dollars of antidumping duty liability hung on this question.
Commerce interpreted the statute to allow looking at the
invoices of the merchandise. If the invoices showed that the en-
tire amount of the sales tax had been charged and Commerce
verified that the taxes were in fact added to or included in the
price of the merchandise sold in Korea, then Commerce would
include the tax in the price of the merchandise sold to the
United States. The CIT disagreed. The CIT maintained that
Commerce's interpretation of the words was too imprecise to be
reasonable. Instead, the CIT stated that Commerce must deter-
mine as precisely as economic science allows - such as by hiring
an econometrician to conduct an econometric study - the ex-
tent to which the tax was included in the Korean price and
"passed through" to consumers in the home market.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, reversing the CIT and af-
firming Commerce. The court held that Commerce need not
conduct an econometric analysis of tax incidence in foreign mar-
kets when deciding whether to add the full amount of the for-
eign tax to the U.S. price.3 9 In so holding, the court strongly
reaffirmed the deference that must be shown to Commerce's im-
plementation of the antidumping law, stating that, "these tenets
[of deference to agency action] extend to their limits when
[Commerce] interprets the antidumping law."4 ° The court went
on to state that "this Court has recognized the ITA as the
'master' of antidumping law, worthy of considerable defer-
ence."
41
The "tax pass-through" issue involved nearly ten years of liti-
38. Id. Section 224 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act has removed this tax
dilemma from U.S. antidumping law by providing that we simply subtract the tax from
the home market price altogether. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 224, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3532 (1994).
39. Daewoo Electronics Co., 6 F.3d at 1519-21.
40. Id. at 1516.
41. Id. (citations omitted).
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gation, millions of dollars, and much heated debate. Intelligent,
experienced judges reached different results when applying the
same standard of review. All of this suggests that the application
of our standard, whether to an issue of fact or an issue of law, is
not an objective event. If this is true forjudges who have applied
the reasonableness standard hundreds of times, it is especially
true for ad hoc panelists whoare applying it for the first time.
To summarize, we can definitively say that our standard of
review does not allow a reviewing body to decide the case de
novo.4" Instead, some deference to, or tolerance for, the
agency's work must be allowed. The reviewing body is not the
chef who makes the meal. It is not allowed into the kitchen to
cook the way it likes. The body is more akin to a food critic
writing for a gourmet magazine: it samples and surveys the meal
as served. For example, if one of the dishes served is identified
as "cooked potatoes," there might be fifty different recipes which
would satisfy this specification, including: french fries, hash
browns, baked potatoes, twice-baked potatoes, or cold potato
salad. If the meal has been decently prepared and reasonably set
forth, then the body recommends it favorably, even though the
body might have added a little more salt here or a little less gar-
lic there. Of course, if the meal is rancid or unpalatable, the
reviewing body will send it back to the chef and say, "cook it
again."43
The impact of this standard upon practicing attorneys who
are advising their clients about litigation under the U.S. AD/
CVD laws requires that they get the facts right and the record
clear at the agency level. If a party loses there, it will not have a
fresh start in the appellate court or before the reviewing panel.
Instead, that party will have an uphill battle; the standard of re-
view will not be a friend under these circumstances. On the
42. An exception exists for issues of statutory construction where the statute on its
face clearly contradicts the agency's interpretation, as we suggested in our example
above concerning the overcast sky.
43. This is called a remand and happens all the time in AD/CVD cases, where one
case may involve many highly technical issues. Sometimes the agency itself requests the
remand, either because there has been a change in law or the agency has discovered an
error. Generally speaking, the fact that remands are not uncommon in this highly tech-
nical area suggests that, much as we government attorneys, as well as those private attor-
neys representing parties who side with the government on an issue, emphasize the
deference which courts and panels must accord the agency, these reviewing entities are
not using the standard as a rubber stamp.
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other hand, if a party wins an issue before the agency and the
opposition seeks review, the standard will work in the initially
successful party's favor, because the opposition will have to fight
against the deference the reviewing body must grant to the
agency.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. standard of review may be summarized as one of
reasonableness, a concept that is simple in the abstract but diffi-
cult to apply in practice. Judges with many years of experience
reviewing agency decisions may differ in application of the stan-
dard to any given case. It is not then surprising that ad hoc
NAFTA panelists may find the concept of the standard elusive.
It may, therefore, help the reviewing body to recall that, it does
not play the role of the chef, but rather that of the gourmet
critic. The reviewer must resist the temptation to go back in the
kitchen and prepare the meal as he or she would have liked.
Rather, the question is whether what has been prepared is de-
cent and palatable, in a word, reasonable.
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